


# Lecture 28

①

- private communication.

As before, consider one-shot setting:



goal is to send a message  $m$  such that Bob can decode but Eve cannot.

Model Eve as having access to environment of channel  
"all powerful quantum eavesdropper"

(2)

Initial state of protocol is

$$\bar{\Phi}_{MU'}^P = \sum_m p(m) |m\rangle\langle m|_U \otimes |m\rangle\langle m|_{U'}$$

Final state of protocol is

$$\omega_{M\hat{U}E}^P = \left( D_{B \rightarrow \hat{U}} \circ \mathcal{U}_{A \rightarrow BE}^N \circ E_{M \rightarrow A} \right) (\bar{\Phi}_{MU'}^P)$$

Defining  $E_{M \rightarrow A}(|m\rangle\langle m|_{U'}) = \rho_A^m$

+

$$D_{B \rightarrow \hat{U}}(\tau_B) = \sum_{\hat{m}} \text{Tr}[\Lambda_B^{\hat{m}} \tau_B] |\hat{m}\rangle\langle \hat{m}|_{\hat{U}}$$

we can write final state as

$$\omega_{M\hat{U}E}^P = \sum_{m, \hat{m}} p(m) |m\rangle\langle m|_U \otimes |m\rangle\langle m|_{U'} \otimes \omega_{E}^{m, \hat{m}}$$

where  $q(\hat{m}|m) = \text{Tr}[\Lambda_B^{\hat{m}} \mathcal{U}_{A \rightarrow BE}^N(\rho_A^m)]$

$$\omega_{E}^{m, \hat{m}} = \text{Tr}_B[\Lambda_B^{\hat{m}} \mathcal{U}_{A \rightarrow BE}^N(\rho_A^m)] / q(\hat{m}|m)$$

3

How to measure performance?  
we want reliability of  
secrecy

1) reliability is the same as before

$$P_{err}(m) = 1 - q(m|m) \leq \epsilon \quad \forall m \in \mathcal{M} \quad (I)$$

2) secrecy: we want that  
there exists a state  $\sigma_E$   
such that

$$F(\sigma_E, N_{A \rightarrow E}^c(p_A^m)) \geq 1 - \epsilon \quad \forall m \in \mathcal{M} \quad (II)$$

If this holds, then the  
eavesdropper's state is  
approximately independent of  
the message.

(4)

We can capture both of these requirements w/ a single-error criterion

$$P_{\text{err}}^* = \inf_{\sigma_E} \max_{M \in \mathcal{M}} \left[ 1 - F(|m\rangle\langle m|_{\hat{U}} \otimes \sigma_E, P_{U' \rightarrow \hat{U}E}(|m\rangle\langle m|_{U'}) \right]$$

where

$$P_{U' \rightarrow \hat{U}E} = D_{B \rightarrow \hat{U}} \circ U_{A \rightarrow BE}^N \circ E_{U' \rightarrow A}$$

↑  
protocol.

can show that  $P_{\text{err}}^* \leq \epsilon$

$\Rightarrow$  (I) + (II)

one-shot private capacity

$$P^{\epsilon}(N) = \sup_{(M, E, D)} \left\{ \log_2 |M| : P_{\text{err}}^* \leq \epsilon \right\}$$

Converse bounds

can show that

$$P^e(N) \leq E_R^e(N)$$

↑  $\alpha$ -relative entropy  
of entanglement

$$E_R^e(N) = \sup_{\Psi_{SA}} \inf_{\sigma_{SB} \in \text{SEP}} D_H^e(N_{A \rightarrow B}(\Psi_{SA}) \| \sigma_{SB})$$

comparison between  
channel output  
state and  
a separable  
state

- basic idea is that we are comparing output state to one that is useless for generating privacy.
- separable states have no privacy b/c the hidden variable could be known to eavesdropper.

(b)

There is another converse bound

First define smooth max-mutual information of bipartite state  $\rho_{AE}$

$$I_{\max}^{\sqrt{\epsilon}}(A; E)_{\rho} = \inf_{\tilde{\rho}_{AE}} \inf_{\tau \in \mathcal{E}} D_{\max}(\tilde{\rho}_{AE} \| \rho_{AE}^{\otimes \tau})$$

$$F(\rho_{AE}, \tilde{\rho}_{AE}) \geq 1 - \epsilon$$

where  $D_{\max}(\omega \| \tau) = \inf \{ \lambda : \omega \leq 2^{\lambda} \tau \}$

Claim:

$$P^{\epsilon}(N) \leq \sup_{\{p(x), \rho_A^x\}_{x \in \mathcal{X}}} [I_H^{\epsilon}(X; B) - I_{\max}^{\sqrt{\epsilon}}(X; E)_{\rho}]$$

where

$$\rho_{ABE} = \sum_x p(x) |x\rangle\langle x| \otimes \mathcal{U}_{A \rightarrow BE}^N(\rho_A^x)$$

(7)

Proof: By some reasoning as before,  
we know that

$$\log_2 |M| \leq I_{\#}^{\epsilon}(M; B)_E$$

where  $\tau_{MBE} = \frac{1}{|M|} \sum_m |\ln \chi_{m|} \otimes \mathcal{U}_{A \rightarrow BE}^{\otimes n}(p_A^m)$

Also, from privacy criterion,

$\exists$  state  $\sigma_E$  such that

$$\epsilon \geq 1 - F(\tau_M \otimes \sigma_E, \tau_{ME})$$

$$\Rightarrow I_{\max}^{\sqrt{\epsilon}}(M; E)_E \leq 0$$

b/c def. involves min over  $\tau_{ME}$

Pick  $\tau_{ME} \approx \tau_M \otimes \sigma_E$

$$\Rightarrow I_{\max}^{\sqrt{\epsilon}}(M; E)_E$$

$$\leq D_{\max}(\tau_M \otimes \sigma_E \| \tau_M \otimes \sigma_E)$$

$$= 0$$

⑧

$$\Rightarrow \log_2 |M| \leq I_H^\varepsilon(M; B)_\varepsilon - I_{\max}^{\sqrt{\varepsilon}}(M; E)_\varepsilon$$

Now optimize over all input  
ensembles  
to get

$$\log_2 |M| \leq \sup_{\{p(x), p_A^x\}} \left[ I_H^\varepsilon(X; B)_\varepsilon - I_{\max}^{\sqrt{\varepsilon}}(X; E)_\varepsilon \right]$$

---

Lower bound

can show that

$$P^\varepsilon(X) \geq$$

$$\begin{aligned} & \bar{I}_H^{\varepsilon' - \delta - \eta}(X; B)_\varepsilon - \bar{I}_{\max}^{\delta - \eta}(E; X) \\ & - \log_2 \left( \frac{8(\varepsilon' - \delta)}{\eta^2} \right) - \log_2 \left( \frac{2}{\eta} \right) \end{aligned}$$

where  $\varepsilon' = 1 - \sqrt{1 - \varepsilon/2}$ ,

$\delta \in (0, \varepsilon')$ ,  $\eta \in (0, \varepsilon' - \delta)$ ,  $\xi \in (0, \delta)$



9

where


$$P_{XBE} = \sum_x p(x) |x\rangle\langle x|_X \otimes \mathcal{U}_{A \rightarrow BE}(p_A^x)$$


---

Main idea behind proof is to use position-based coding combined w/ another technique called convex split.

Let us discuss convex split

Consider scenarios of position-based coding



Suppose Alice chooses message uniformly @ random, rather than deterministically

(10)

For fixed  $m$ , recall that the state is

$$\rho_{B'_1} \otimes \dots \otimes \rho_{B'_{m-1}} \otimes \rho_{BB'_m} \otimes \rho_{B'_{m+1}} \otimes \dots \otimes \rho_{B'_M}$$

If  $m$  is random, then state is  
the mixture

$$\tau = \frac{1}{M} \sum_{m=1}^M \rho_{B'_1} \otimes \dots \otimes \rho_{B'_{m-1}} \otimes \rho_{BB'_m} \otimes \rho_{B'_{m+1}} \otimes \dots \otimes \rho_{B'_M} \quad (*)$$

As  $M$  gets longer, it becomes  
more difficult to distinguish  
the above state from a product  
state

$$\rho_{B'_1} \otimes \dots \otimes \rho_{B'_i} \otimes \rho_B$$

Intuition: look @ reduced state of  
(\*) on  $B'_i \oplus B$ :

$$\tau_{BB'} = \frac{1}{M} \rho_{BB'} + \left(1 - \frac{1}{M}\right) \rho_B \otimes \rho_{B'}$$

(11)

Roughly speaking,

$$\rho_{BB'} \leq 2^{D_{\max}(\rho_{BB'} \| \rho_B \otimes \rho_{B'})} \rho_B \otimes \rho_{B'}$$

$$\Rightarrow \tau_{BB'} \leq \underbrace{\left( \frac{2^{D_{\max}}}{M} + 1 - \frac{1}{M} \right)}_{\text{key relation}} \rho_B \otimes \rho_{B'}$$

if  $\log_2 M \approx D_{\max}(\rho_{BB'} \| \rho_B \otimes \rho_{B'})$

then  $\tau_{BB'}$  looks like product state  $\rho_B \otimes \rho_{B'}$

can use this intuition to get the following:

$$\text{if } \log_2 M \geq \overline{I}_{\max}(\mathbb{B}; \mathbb{B}')_{\rho} + \log_2 \left( \frac{2}{n^2} \right)$$

then there exists a state  $\rho_B$  such that

$$F(\tau, \rho_{B_1} \otimes \dots \otimes \rho_{B_n} \otimes \rho_B) \geq 1 - \epsilon^2$$

Idea for protocols (Wyner) 1970s


Message variable  $m \in \{1, \dots, M\}$

Local randomness variable  $r \in \{1, \dots, R\}$

Alice, Bob, Eve share  $M \cdot R$  copies of

$$p(x'x'') = \sum_x p(x) p(x'|x) p(x''|x)$$

Example:  $X_{m,r}$  Prob  $m=2, r=3$



(13)

If Alice wants to send message  $m$ , she picks  $r$  @ random

from  $\{1, \dots, R\}$  + sends

system  $X_{m,r}$  through encoder + channel.

For fixed  $m$  &  $r$  state is

$$P_{X_{m,r} X'_{m,r} X''_{m,r} B E} = P_{X_{m,1} X'_{m,1} X''_{m,1}} \otimes \dots \otimes$$

$$P_{X_{m,r-1} X'_{m,r-1} X''_{m,r-1}} \otimes P_{X_{m,r} X'_{m,r} X''_{m,r} B E} \otimes$$

$$P_{X_{m,r+1} X'_{m,r+1} X''_{m,r+1}} \otimes \dots \otimes P_{X_{m,R} X'_{m,R} X''_{m,R}}$$

adopt shorthand  $X_{ij} = X_{ij} X'_{ij} X''_{ij}$

~~For fixed  $m$~~

Bob can then use position-based coding to figure out  $m$  &  $r$  as long as

(14)

$$\log_2 |MR| = \bar{I}_H^{\epsilon-n}(X; B)_p - \log_2 \left( \frac{4\epsilon}{n^2} \right)$$

For fixed value of  $m$ , state of Eve is

$$P_{X''MR_E}^m = \frac{1}{R} \sum_{r=1}^R P_{X''_{1,1}} \otimes \dots \otimes P_{X''_{m,r-1}} \otimes P_{X''_{m,r}E} \otimes P_{X''_{m,r+1}} \otimes \dots \otimes P_{X''_{MR}}$$

From convex split, if we

$$\text{take } \log_2 R = \bar{I}_{\max}^{\sqrt{\epsilon-n}}(E; X)_p + \log_2 \left( \frac{2}{n^2} \right)$$

then we are guaranteed that

$$1 - F(P_{X''MR_E}^m, P_{X''_{1,1}} \otimes \dots \otimes P_{X''_{m,r}E} \otimes \tilde{P}_E) \leq \epsilon$$

Thus, the # of bits transmitted

private

(15)

is

$$\log_2 M = \bar{I}_H^{\epsilon-n}(X;B) - \bar{I}^{\sqrt{\epsilon-n}}(E;X)_p \\ - \log_2\left(\frac{4\epsilon}{n^2}\right) - \log_2\left(\frac{2}{n^2}\right)$$

From here, we combine

different notions of error

into a single error,

derandomize, expurgate,

& arrive @ the claim.